Richard Rowland
Richard Rowland
Research Fellow in Moral Philosophy, Australian Catholic University
Verified email at acu.edu.au - Homepage
TitleCited byYear
Moral error theory and the argument from epistemic reasons
R Rowland
J. Ethics & Soc. Phil. 7, ii, 2012
482012
Rescuing companions in guilt arguments
R Rowland
The Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262), 161-171, 2015
192015
In defence of good simpliciter
R Rowland
Philosophical Studies 173 (5), 1371-1391, 2016
102016
The epistemology of moral disagreement
R Rowland
Philosophy Compass 12 (2), 2017
92017
Reasons as the unity among the varieties of goodness
R Rowland
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2), 200-227, 2016
82016
Dissolving the wrong kind of reason problem
R Rowland
Philosophical Studies 172 (6), 1455-1474, 2015
82015
The Significance of Significant Fundamental Moral Disagreement1
R Rowland
Nos 51 (4), 802-831, 2017
72017
Wrong kind of reasons and consequences
R Rowland
Utilitas 25 (3), 405-416, 2013
72013
Companions in Guilt: Arguments in Metaethics
C Cowie, R Rowland
Routledge, 2019
4*2019
Reasons or Fittingness First?
R Rowland
Ethics 128 (1), 212-229, 2017
42017
The Normative and the Evaluative: The Buck-Passing Account of Value
R Rowland
Oxford University Press, 2019
32019
The intelligibility of moral intransigence: A dilemma for cognitivism about moral judgment
R Rowland
Analysis 78 (2), 266-275, 2017
32017
Our Intuitions About the Experience Machine
R Rowland
J. Ethics & Soc. Phil. 12, 110, 2017
12017
WHY PASS EVERY BUCK? ON SKORUPSKI'S BUCK‐PASSING ACCOUNT OF NORMATIVITY
R Rowland
Ratio 24 (3), 340-348, 2011
12011
11 Companions in guilt arguments in the epistemology of moral disagreement
R Rowland
Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics: Arguments in Metaethics, 2019
2019
Moral Error Theory
R Rowland
The Philosophical Quarterly, 2019
2019
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Articles 1–16