| Moral error theory and the argument from epistemic reasons R Cosker-Rowland J. Ethics & Soc. Phil. 7, ii, 2012 | 83 | 2012 |
| The Normative and the Evaluative: The Buck-Passing Account of Value R Rowland Oxford University Press, 2019 | 53 | 2019 |
| Rescuing companions in guilt arguments R Cosker-Rowland The Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262), 161-171, 2016 | 33 | 2016 |
| The epistemology of moral disagreement R Rowland Philosophy Compass 12 (2), 2017 | 32 | 2017 |
| The Significance of Significant Fundamental Moral Disagreement R Cosker-Rowland Noûs 51 (4), 802-831, 2017 | 29 | 2017 |
| Moral Disagreement R Rowland Routledge, 2020 | 28 | 2020 |
| In defence of good simpliciter R Rowland Philosophical Studies 173 (5), 1371-1391, 2016 | 25 | 2016 |
| Companions in Guilt: Arguments in Metaethics C Cowie, R Rowland Routledge, 2019 | 23* | 2019 |
| Dissolving the wrong kind of reason problem R Rowland Philosophical Studies 172 (6), 1455-1474, 2015 | 19 | 2015 |
| Fittingness: A user’s guide C Howard, RA Rowland | 18* | 2022 |
| Reasons as the Unity among the Varieties of Goodness R Cosker‐Rowland Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2), 200-227, 2016 | 15 | 2016 |
| Wrong kind of reasons and consequences R Rowland Utilitas 25 (3), 405-416, 2013 | 13 | 2013 |
| Our Intuitions About the Experience Machine R Rowland J. Ethics & Soc. Phil. 12, 110, 2017 | 12 | 2017 |
| Reasons or Fittingness First? R Rowland Ethics 128 (1), 212-229, 2017 | 10 | 2017 |
| The intelligibility of moral intransigence: A dilemma for cognitivism about moral judgment R Cosker-Rowland Analysis 78 (2), 266-275, 2018 | 9 | 2018 |
| The Authoritative Normativity of Fitting Attitudes RA Rowland Oxford Studies in Metaethics 17, 2022 | 6 | 2022 |
| Local Evolutionary Debunking Arguments R Rowland Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1), 170-199, 2019 | 6 | 2019 |
| The Normativity of Gender R Cosker-Rowland Noûs, 2023 | 5 | 2023 |
| Epistemic Permissivism and Reasonable Pluralism R Rowland, RM Simpson The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology, 113-122, 2021 | 5 | 2021 |
| 11 Companions in guilt arguments in the epistemology of moral disagreement R Rowland Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics: Arguments in Metaethics, 2019 | 5* | 2019 |
Robert Mark SimpsonAssociate Professor in Philosophy, University College LondonVerified email at ucl.ac.uk
