| Knowing how without knowing that Y Cath Knowing how: Essays on knowledge, mind and action, 113-35, 2011 | 127 | 2011 |
| Reflective equilibrium Y Cath The Oxford handbook of philosophical methodology 1, 2016 | 78 | 2016 |
| Revisionary intellectualism and Gettier Y Cath Philosophical Studies 172, 7-27, 2015 | 73 | 2015 |
| The ability hypothesis and the new knowledge-how Y Cath Noûs 43 (1), 137-156, 2009 | 38 | 2009 |
| Knowing how Y Cath Analysis 79 (3), 487-503, 2019 | 29 | 2019 |
| Knowing what it is like and testimony Y Cath Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1), 105-120, 2019 | 28 | 2019 |
| Regarding a regress Y Cath Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3), 358-388, 2013 | 23 | 2013 |
| Intellectualism and testimony Y Cath Analysis 77 (2), 259-266, 2017 | 18 | 2017 |
| Know how and skill: The puzzles of priority and equivalence Y Cath The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise, 157-167, 2020 | 13 | 2020 |
| Evidence and intuition Y Cath Episteme 9 (4), 311-328, 2012 | 11 | 2012 |
| Knowing how and ‘knowing how’ Y Cath The Palgrave handbook of philosophical methods, 527-552, 2015 | 8 | 2015 |
| A Practical Guide to Intellectualism Y Cath | 6 | 2008 |
| Transformative experiences and the equivocation objection Y Cath Inquiry, 1-22, 2022 | 5 | 2022 |
| ‘Know-how as Competence: A Rylean Responsibilist Account’, by David Löwenstein Y Cath Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (3), 633-634, 2019 | 5 | 2019 |
| Metaphilosophy Y Cath Oxford Bibliographies, 2011 | 5 | 2011 |
| Social Epistemology and Knowing-How Y Cath | 2 | 2024 |
| Expanding the Client’s Perspective Y Cath The Philosophical Quarterly 73 (3), 701-721, 2023 | | 2023 |
| Seumas Miller on Knowing-How and Joint Abilities Y Cath | | 2020 |
| Review of Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy Y Cath | | 2015 |
