Spring: A strategy-proof and privacy preserving spectrum auction mechanism Q Huang, Y Tao, F Wu 2013 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM, 827-835, 2013 | 86 | 2013 |

Towards privacy preservation in strategy-proof spectrum auction mechanisms for noncooperative wireless networks F Wu, Q Huang, Y Tao, G Chen IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking 23 (4), 1271-1285, 2014 | 28 | 2014 |

Large market games with near optimal efficiency R Cole, Y Tao Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 791-808, 2016 | 17* | 2016 |

Generalized second price auction with probabilistic broad match W Chen, D He, TY Liu, T Qin, Y Tao, L Wang Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation, 39-56, 2014 | 11 | 2014 |

Dynamics of distributed updating in Fisher markets YK Cheung, R Cole, Y Tao Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 351-368, 2018 | 6 | 2018 |

An Analysis of Asynchronous Stochastic Accelerated Coordinate Descent R Cole, Y Tao arXiv preprint arXiv:1808.05156, 2018 | 1 | 2018 |

Balancing the Robustness and Convergence of Tatonnement R Cole, Y Tao arXiv preprint arXiv:1908.00844, 2019 | | 2019 |

On the Existence of Pareto Efficient and Envy Free Allocations R Cole, Y Tao arXiv preprint arXiv:1906.07257, 2019 | | 2019 |

Parallel Stochastic Asynchronous Coordinate Descent: Tight Bounds on the Possible Parallelism YK Cheung, R Cole, Y Tao arXiv preprint arXiv:1811.05087, 2018 | | 2018 |

Optimal Parallelism Bound for Fully Asynchronous Coordinate Descent with Linear Speedup YK Cheung, R Cole, Y Tao arXiv preprint arXiv:1811.03254, 2018 | | 2018 |

Parallel Stochastic Asynchronous Coordinate Descent: Tight Bounds on the Possible Parallelism Y Kuen Cheung, R Cole, Y Tao arXiv, arXiv: 1811.05087, 2018 | | 2018 |

Optimal Parallelism Bound for Fully Asynchronous Coordinate Descent with Linear Speedup Y Kuen Cheung, R Cole, Y Tao arXiv, arXiv: 1811.03254, 2018 | | 2018 |

Dynamics of Distributed Updating in Fisher Markets Y Kuen Cheung, R Cole, Y Tao arXiv, arXiv: 1806.04746, 2018 | | 2018 |