Dominique Lepelley

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William V. GehrleinUniversity of DelawareVerified email at udel.edu
Jean BonnetProfessor of Economics University of CaenVerified email at unicaen.fr
Florenz PlassmannProfessor of Economics and Political Science, Xavier UniversityVerified email at xavier.edu
Philippe LecomteAgricultural science, CIRAD France, CRA-W BelgiumVerified email at cirad.fr
mathieu martinTHEMAVerified email at u-cergy.fr
Thibault LaurentCNRS, Toulouse School of EconomicsVerified email at univ-tlse1.fr
Fabrice BarthélémyProfesseur d'économie, Université de Versailles St-QuentinVerified email at uvsq.fr
Michel PaulCEMOI - Université de La RéunionVerified email at univ-reunion.fr
Eric PenotCIRAD UMR innovation 85Verified email at cirad.fr
Stephane BlancardL'Institut Agro Dijon - CESAERVerified email at institut-agro.fr
Nicolas SaugerSciences PoVerified email at sciences-po.fr
Antonin MacéCNRS, Paris School of Economics, Ecole Normale Supérieure-PSLVerified email at psemail.eu
Jonathan Vayssièresumr SELMET, CIRADVerified email at cirad.fr
Achill SchürmannInstitute for Mathematics, University of RostockVerified email at uni-rostock.de
Marc FleurbaeyParis School of EconomicsVerified email at psemail.eu

Dominique Lepelley

professeur (émérite) de sciences économiques, CEMOI, université de La Réunion

Verified email at univ-reunion.fr

choix social vote


Title Sort by citations Sort by year Sort by title	Cited by Cited by	Year
Voting paradoxes and group coherence: the Condorcet efficiency of voting rules WV Gehrlein, D Lepelley Springer Science & Business Media, 2010	212	2010
On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory D Lepelley, A Louichi, H Smaoui Social Choice and Welfare 30 (3), 363-383, 2008	139	2008
Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation P Favardin, D Lepelley, J Serais Review of Economic Design 7, 213-228, 2002	125	2002
Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules P Favardin, D Lepelley Social Choice and Welfare 26 (3), 485-509, 2006	99	2006
Elections, voting rules and paradoxical outcomes WV Gehrlein, D Lepelley Springer, 2017	84	2017
Voting rules, manipulability and social homogeneity D Lepelley, F Valognes Public Choice 116 (1), 165-184, 2003	76	2003
The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences D Lepelley, B Mbih Social Choice and Welfare 11 (3), 253-265, 1994	75	1994
On probability models in voting theory S Berg, D Lepelley Statistica Neerlandica 48 (2), 133-146, 1994	73	1994
The probability of conflicts in a US presidential type election MR Feix, D Lepelley, VR Merlin, JL Rouet Economic Theory 23, 227-257 (2004), 2004	70	2004
The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule D Lepelley, B Mbih Economics Letters 24 (4), 311-315, 1987	60	1987
Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates D Lepelley, V Merlin Economic Theory 17, 53-80, 2001	58	2001
On the probability of electing the Condorcet D Lepelley Mathematical Social Sciences 25 (2), 105-116, 1993	51	1993
The likelihood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections D Lepelley, F Chantreuil, S Berg Mathematical Social Sciences 31 (3), 133-146, 1996	47	1996
La mesure du pouvoir de vote NG Andjiga, F Chantreuil, D Lepelley Mathématiques et sciences humaines. Mathematics and social sciences, 2003	46	2003
The Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and the probability of electing the Condorcet loser WV Gehrlein, D Lepelley Journal of Mathematical Economics 29 (3), 271-283, 1998	40	1998
The Condorcet efficiency of Borda rule with anonymous voters WV Gehrlein, D Lepelley Mathematical Social Sciences 41 (1), 39-50, 2001	39	2001
On the voting power of an alliance and the subsequent power of its members MR Feix, D Lepelley, VR Merlin, JL Rouet Social Choice and Welfare 28 (2), 181-207, 2007	35	2007
On some limitations of the median voting rule WV Gehrlein, D Lepelley Public Choice 117, 177-190, 2003	32	2003
Scoring rules, Condorcet efficiency and social homogeneity D Lepelley, P Pierron, F Valognes Theory and Decision 49 (2), 175-196, 2000	31	2000
Majority efficient representation of the citizens in a federal union M Feix, D Lepelley, V Merlin, JL Rouet, L Vidu Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models: Essays by and in Honor of …, 2021	28	2021

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