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Christoph Kuzmics
Christoph Kuzmics
Department of Economics, University of Graz
Verified email at uni-graz.at - Homepage
Title
Cited by
Cited by
Year
Tail‐dependence in stock‐return pairs
I Fortin, C Kuzmics
Intelligent Systems in Accounting, Finance & Management 11 (2), 89-107, 2002
1202002
Representative consumer's risk aversion and efficient risk-sharing rules
C Hara, J Huang, C Kuzmics
Journal of Economic Theory 137 (1), 652-672, 2007
87*2007
Abraham Wald's complete class theorem and Knightian uncertainty
C Kuzmics
Games and Economic Behavior 104, 666-673, 2017
56*2017
Hidden symmetries and focal points
C Alós-Ferrer, C Kuzmics
Journal of Economic Theory 148 (1), 226-258, 2013
522013
Symmetric play in repeated allocation games
C Kuzmics, T Palfrey, BW Rogers
Journal of Economic Theory 154, 25-67, 2014
382014
Refined best reply correspondence and dynamics
D Balkenborg, J Hofbauer, C Kuzmics
Theoretical Economics 8 (1), 165-192, 2013
362013
Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability
F Herold, C Kuzmics
Games and Economic Behavior 67 (2), 542-551, 2009
36*2009
On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget
C Kuzmics, JH Steg
Journal of Economic Theory 170, 56-69, 2017
262017
Effects of background risks on cautiousness with an application to a portfolio choice problem
C Hara, J Huang, C Kuzmics
Journal of Economic Theory 146 (1), 346-358, 2011
25*2011
Stochastic evolutionary stability in extensive form games of perfect information
C Kuzmics
Games and Economic Behavior 48 (2), 321-336, 2004
24*2004
The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games
D Balkenborg, J Hofbauer, C Kuzmics
International Journal of Game Theory 44, 165-193, 2015
18*2015
Pre-election polls as strategic coordination devices
C Andonie, C Kuzmics
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 84 (2), 681-700, 2012
152012
On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations
C Kuzmics
Games and Economic Behavior 72 (2), 452-466, 2011
152011
Individual and group selection in symmetric 2-player games
C Kuzmics
Mimeo, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2003
92003
The (non-) robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state independent
C Diehl, C Kuzmics
International Journal of Game Theory 50 (4), 911-925, 2021
82021
The evolution of taking roles
F Herold, C Kuzmics
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 174, 38-63, 2020
72020
An incomplete information justification of symmetric equilibrium in symmetric games
C Kuzmics, BW Rogers
Available at SSRN 1712102, 2010
72010
Limit Orders and Knightian Uncertainty
M Greinecker, C Kuzmics
arXiv preprint arXiv:2208.10804, 2022
52022
A comment on “Egalitarianism and efficiency in repeated symmetric games” by V. Bhaskar [Games Econ. Behav. 32 (2000) 247–262]
C Kuzmics, B Rogers
Games and Economic Behavior 74 (1), 240-242, 2012
52012
Is ellsberg behavior evidence of ambiguity aversion?
C Kuzmics, B Rogers, X Zhang
Available at SSRN 3437331, 2020
42020
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Articles 1–20